The Joint Ventures

They never invested a dollar. They placed caveats on their own titles. The media called them victims.

How the JVs Were Structured

I was approached by property owners who wanted to become developers themselves — to profit from building on their own land rather than just selling it. They didn't invest money with me. They didn't hand over funds. They contributed their properties as equity, retained ownership of their land, and were effectively the developers.

I was a joint venture partner contributing expertise, management, and funding connections — with a transparent validation system giving every party and their lawyers real-time visibility into every dollar spent. No corruption. No hidden margins. Just a shared project on their own property, where everyone could see exactly where the money went.

What Went Wrong

The property market crashed 30–35%. That was the starting event — not the caveats, not the management. Every developer in New Zealand got hit. Funders across the board reduced their lending. The money we had lined up for both projects was slashed.

I had been funding development projects through non-bank lenders — private funders who lend against the security of the property. When the market dropped, they reappraised the land values and cut their lending limits. Less security meant less funding. Less funding meant construction couldn't continue at the planned pace.

Then came the second blow: in both projects — Yates Road in Māngere East and Triangle Road in Massey — the landowners placed caveats on their own titles, in breach of the joint venture agreements.

Funders require the right to sell as security. A caveat makes funding impossible. This is not a minor procedural issue — it stops everything. No security means no loan. No loan means no construction. No construction means no profit for anyone.

I've months of emails pleading with the JV partners to remove the caveats. They were advised by their lawyers to place them. That decision — combined with the market crash that had already reduced funding — killed the projects.

The media narrative implied that people "invested with me" and I lost their money. This is false. They didn't give me money. The market crashed, funders pulled back, and the landowners' own lawyers told them to block what remaining funding was possible.

What I Put In

When the funders reduced their lending, I didn't walk away. I put $2.3 million of my own money into the joint venture projects — topping up the reduced funding to keep construction going while we waited for the market to recover.

Every economist, every bank, every industry commentator predicted the market would bounce back. It was supposed to be temporary. I made the call to bridge the gap with my own funds rather than let the projects stall — because stalled construction sites lose more money than slow ones.

The market didn't recover. It still hasn't.

When the caveats were added on top of the funding reductions, the situation became impossible. I offered to personally underwrite all JV partners' land positions from my future profits. Five of the six partners called to thank me for that offer. They understood the situation.

But no amount of personal bridging could replace institutional funding when the security was blocked by caveats placed by the landowners themselves.

$0
Money JV partners invested with me
$2.3M
My own money put in to keep projects alive
2
Projects killed by caveats
5/6
JV partners who understood the situation

What Property Investors Should Know

If you're entering a joint venture for property development in New Zealand, here's what the news does not tell you:

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